554 seen" at any such function. It would appear that the mechanism
571 at work here is not simply a device to provide the younger
182 generation with a tension-release situation, but also a
561 symbolic expression of the difference between the possessors
[154] and the non-possessors of authority, a confirmation of the political order.

[578] The avoidance practice, or separation, between the old and the young in the "party" situation is a structural fact of Bedouin society, and, though it may ultimately be defined as a conflict control or legitimating mechanism, in the context of culture change new aspects and meanings attach
554 to the phenomenon. The "status group" is an agent of change
571 in al-Qasr; its members can afford to gamble in the market
178 economy of Marsa Matruh since they possess the reserve capital
[471] (in the form of sheep) and the social prestige which permits
[439] this. The "status group," with business and social relations
[179] in Marsa Matruh, enjoys both the benefits of associational ties with the Egyptians and the communal ties with their fellow Bedouins. They see themselves as being different from their fellow tribesmen, and they tend to face more towards Marsa Matruh than al-Qasr. In short, they are the "cultural brokers" who support an ideology of change, they extol the benefits of a new way of life over and against the old.

[789] One repudiation of tradition which constitutes an
[796] attempt to define the style of life of the "status group"

156 of them) cater largely to the needs of the lineage in whose
159 territory they are located. They are operated mostly on a
554 credit basis. Lineage members, as debtors, feel gratitude
443 but also, and more importantly, loyalty toward their kinsman
423 and creditor. Hajj 'Ali is the only member of al-Qasr who
472 owns two shops, and the only Bedouin in the whole Western Desert
* [613] who owns three shops. His brother owns a shop in Matruh.
[452] Furthermore, the shop in Sallum is in a strategic position on
156 the Libyan border which, coincidentally or not, is a point
159 for importing, and also smuggling, foreign goods into Egypt.
554 The possession and utilization of foreign products is definitely
443 a status symbol all over Egypt. Hence, the person in this
• 439 area who can control, however slightly, the distribution of
472 such goods has a lever with which to exact prestige and
favors from the "status group" in al-Qasr who now welcome
these symbols (tobacco, pistols, rifles, radios) and the
bureaucrats of Marsa Matruh who crave them (food goods,
clothing materials, car parts).

156 Besides all this, Hajj 'Ali is involved in a small
159 stone-cutting operation which supplies stones for house
554 building, he cooperates with his three brothers in a well-
[316] cleaning concern, and contracts government heavy equipment
[312] to build earth dams. The material evidence of his status
[427] is that he is the only man in al-Qasr with two compound-type
[342] houses (one he built thirteen years ago), and the only man
[595] with four wives.

156 with four wives. It is not hard to understand why the people
159 of al-Qasr consider Hajj 'Ali a rajal khair par excellence.
554 For instance, when I asked one man if he could give me some
627 examples of court cases, he replied: "The one who is not an
124 'aqila pays no attention to anything save getting food for
his children. The rajal khair has money and men (a reference
to the "old days" when a person needed cohorts for battle),
and so he always pays instead of us. He lends us money and
helps us in doing anything, like Hajj 'Ali does." In another
124 interview, one man showed great respect for Hajj 'Ali's tradi-
156 tional status and modern ability to deal with the outside
159 world by giving him the honorific title of "shaikh," and
554 showing that the Bedouins of al-Qasr put their trust in him:
•439 "When the olive merchants come from Alexandria, they go to
472 Shaikh 'Ali, someone who knows about olives. They ask him
245 what kind of olives al-Qasr has. He shows the merchants, and
they say: 'I will give you so much for them.' They make an
agreement, and Hajj 'Ali collects the olives and gets the
price for them."

156 In terms of local politics, I would guess, but do
159 not have data to prove, that Hajj 'Ali was the third party
554 most frequently referred to in seeking a termination of
[627] conflict. He was commonly asked to participate in these
[114] matters not only by the disputants themselves but also by
the 'aqila or other third party presiding. He was sometimes

236 Wool is also very important to the economy of Awlad Ali. Lamb's
286 wool is either sold or spun and woven into rugs. Goat's wool is spun and woven to provide the cover for the tents.

231 Sheep and goats are rarely slaughtered for meat except on special
[262] occasions. Most male and many female lambs and kids are sold in the
[432] market and the money is used to buy the necessary supply of food (like
[438] tea, sugar, salt, etc.), clothes, and other household items. Most of
438 these items are obtained from the shops in the settled communities in
439 the area, although some of the major items can be obtained only from
443 large urban centers like Alexandria.

231 The other domesticated animals that Awlad Ali keep are the donkey
492 for transport and riding, a few camels for heavy transport and also for
[236] wool, very few horses for riding on special occasions (they are con-
[554] sidered as a status symbol for those who own them), and the dog to guard the camp and to protect the herds from wolves and other predators.

235 Poultry are usually kept for meat and eggs which are sometimes sold by
432 the women in the nearby markets.

233 The main occupation in the area is stock raising. Grazing lands
137 extend generally south of the cultivated land in the northern strip.
[132] The growth of pasture plants is affected by the amount of rainfall in a particular year. Low rainfall causes acute shortages of pasture and herbage, and leads to the death of animals by both starvation and thirst. Pasture plants comprise a wide variety of bushes, scrub, and many other species of grasses, most of which have a very short life span. These plants normally persist from December to May; then the land is turned into arid, hard desert with only a few dispersed patches of dry grass.

There was some smuggling
439 of goods across the Libyan border, but this smuggling was done on a
648 very small scale. Before the Egyptian government imposed restrictions on imports, the prices of the goods in the Libyan market were close to their prices on the Egyptian market. Except for a very few items which were not found on the Egyptian market, smuggling goods from Libya offered
C53 a very limited financial gain to the smugglers. In recent years, this situation has changed, however. With population increase in Egypt threatening disaster, and with the cultivable land in the valley reaching its maximum productivity, the attention of the government was drawn to the fertile yet dry land of the northern strip of the Western Desert as a possible means of expanding the cultivated area. A number of projects are taking place at the present time under the land reclamation act. The most important of these projects is the Eastern Mariut project which is directed toward the irrigation of the lands of the Western Desert through the channelling of the flood waters of the Nile into a network of canals covering an extensive area of the northern strip of the Western
315 Desert. Also, recently, oil has been discovered in the area, and since
457 the end of the Second World War, the area has been a major attraction for tourists.

439 More important is the increase in traffic of smuggled goods from
[651] Libya. Custom restrictions on imported goods to Egypt have created a
[656] scarcity of American and British manufactured goods which raised their price on the Egyptian market and made smuggling a profitable activity. An opposite-direction smuggling of sheep and goats from Egypt to Libya
[315] created a great shortage in the Egyptian meat market. Before the discovery of oil in Libya, the Western Desert area supplied the Egyptian

439 [315] market with more than one-third of its lamb meat. The other two-thirds of the lamb market was supplied from the Sudan, the Delta, and [315] from Libya. Oil industry in Libya attracted a large number of the young [178] tribal members in Libya, who had originally undertaken the main task of [464] sheep pastoralism. As a result, the population of sheep and goats in Libya dropped sharply. Not only did the Libyan market become unable to supply the Egyptian market, but it was also unable to support itself and was forced to pay high prices for the Western Desert sheep and goats. [457] The price became even more attractive after the devaluation of the Egyptian pound which gave higher value to the Libyan currency, and hence, the price of sheep. In the last decade, the number of smuggled sheep reached a point where it created a great shortage of lamb meat in Egypt. All government attempts to stop smuggling activities in either direction have failed.

657 All these factors attracted the attention of the government to the area and its people. The need to control the tribal population became evident. But since it is difficult, if not impossible, to control a population which is constantly on the move, the first step the government took to control the tribal population was to settle them in permanent villages. A number of projects are underway. The aims of these [654] [137] projects are to increase the cultivated land and to improve the pastures by introducing new and highly nutritive pasture plants in areas where agriculture is not feasible. Attempts have also been made to promote local crafts and industries. The intentional efforts of the government [178] [464] to settle the tribal population is supplemented by the gradual drift of many tribesmen, especially the younger generation, to seek part-time or

613 it was impossible to verify the actual facts or to know what exactly
682 happened. But since the parties involved are still alive and since these
683 events are closely related to present-day happenings, the case is still
672 alive in the minds of the parties involved as well as those of outsiders-
558 Naturlaly, each party tries to present the facts in such a way as to
(124) support his own claims. Shei'eb, for example, insists that Hakim had
613 bribed members of bait Asabei' to refuse to pay their share in order to
682 embarrass him and make him appear as unable to perform his duties as
683 Aqila. "Hakim always had his eyes on becoming the Aqila of bait Asabei'," said Shei'eb, "but he had no business becoming the Aqila, so he had to make me look bad to the other Awaqil.... He likes to be looked up to as a big man, but it wouldn't work." While other members of bait Asabei' deny that Hakim had bribed them, they agree with Shei'eb that Hakim is a
156 dishonest man. In fact, Hakim's reputation is so widespread in the area
551 that it has earned him the nickname of "the thief". The nickname was
788 given to him a few years ago when he went to Mecca for a pilgrimage with
685 another fellow tribesman. The latter told the story that while in Mecca Hakim had found a purse with two hundred pounds in it. He was supposed to return the purse to the authorities or it would be considered as stealing if he kept it. Stealing in Mecca is not only a crime but also a great sin which makes the holy trip void for the offender. Hakim told his companion that he had given the purse to the authorities. But later, on their way back from Mecca, the friend found the purse hidden in Hakim's luggage. When the story was known in the area, he was referred to as
156 "the thief". Other accounts of Hakim's dishonesty are told throughout
685 the area, including stories of how he acquired his wealth through stealing
439

156 equipment from the government projects and from smuggling sheep and mer-
[685] chandise across the Libyan border. Although some of these stories might
[439] be exaggerated, they all point to the fact that Hakim, despite his wealth,
is not the most popular or reputable individual in bait Asabei', and that
although Shei'eb is not a popular individual either, he definitely comes
up the winner in any popularity contest between the two. The question is
156 why Hakim was selected by the Awaqil to replace Shei'eb. The case in-
613 volved more than Shei'eb's inability to collect the money from members of
558 his bait. Shei'eb's ineffectiveness seemed to have been taken as an ex-
682 cuse rather than as the direct cause. Many Aqaqil, before Shei'eb, had
683 failed in collecting money from their own bait without being subject to
direct challenge. What seems to be involved is more than a challenge to
a particular member, Shei'eb. It is a challenge to the whole principle
by which Shei'eb acquired his position as Aqila of bait Asabei': pat-
rilineal succession.

156 Shei'eb is the youngest of four sons of the former Aqila of bait
159 Asabei', Sheikh Elewa. For more than fifty years Sheikh Elewa was the
613 undisputed Aqila of bait Asabei'. He also had considerable influence
463 among other tribal segments throughout the whole of the Western Desert
683 by virtue of his position as "nazzar", that is, the expert who assesses
554 the amount of compensation for wound inflicted in a liable case. The
[428] position of nazzar is a hereditary one and had been handed down from
[779] father to son. The basis for his assessment of wounds are a number of
old books believed to be obtained from Mecca and contain all the judg-
ments of famous Islamic leaders in their assessments of wounds.

[428] Eleven years ago when Sheikh Elewa became blind and too old to

156 exercise his functions, he invited all the important people in the area
159 into a large gathering during which he announced that he was handing the
613 sacred books to Shei'eb, who was to become the nazzar and also to succeed
463 him as the Aqila of bait Asabei'. Although at that time Shei'eb was
683 fairly young, twenty-six, nobody questioned Sheikh Elewa's decision.
554 "He is the Aqila," said one informant, "and he has the right to decide
428 which of his sons is to succeed him. After all, he knows his sons better
[079] than anybody else and knows which one is best for the job." Most people
156 thought that Sheikh Elewa, being still alive and with clear thinking,
159 would help Shei'eb in performing his duties as Aqila. A few months after
613 Shei'eb took over his father's position, it became apparent that he was
554 too immature for the job. He tried to use his position to take money
578 from members of his bait and when they refused to give him any money, he
[661] entered into fights with a number of them. Rumors spread that he took
bribes from the disputing parties who came to him for him to assess the
legal compensation for wounds to raise or lower his estimate. But still
people within bait Asabei' as well as outside it respected Sheikh Elewa's
decision and did not challenge Shei'eb openly. But as time passed the
dissatisfaction with Shei'eb grew. This dissatisfaction came mainly from
members of the Amar who were affected directly by Shei'eb's actions, es-
pecially those actions which resulted in the payment of compensation for
wounds inflicted in fights.

PHASE II

439 On the evening of May 16, 1966, two members of the Geneishat tribe
of Matruh area came to Burg-el-Arab with a large shipment of smuggled
cigarettes to leave with their partner in the area, Hadi, from the

439 Aggary Eila. When they arrived with the cigarettes, Hadi was not at his tent; he was in the market of the nearby town selling sheep. They left the cigarettes and left for Alexandria to arrange for their distribution. In Alexandria they met Rabbuh Hakim, the son of Hakim, who married a girl from Alexandria and lived there. He made his income from buying smuggled goods at wholesale prices and selling them at a profit. When he met the two members of the Geneishat tribe and learned from them about the shipment they left at Hadi's place, he wanted to buy it. But they refused on the grounds that Hadi had already contacted someone and that all they could do was to give the first option to that individual. Two
439 hours after the conversation between Rabbuh Hakim and the Geneishat, the
625 police officer on duty at the station of Burg el-Arab received an anonymous call from Alexandria informing him that a shipment of smuggled cigarettes worth more than three thousand pounds was hidden in Hadi's olive mill (which was not in use at that time). The call was overheard by a member of the Sanagrah tribe who works as a detective with the police. He tried to warn Hadi of the police raid but it was too late. The officer found the cigarettes in Hadi's olive mill in the exact place where the informant said they would be. The cigarettes were confiscated and Hadi was arrested and later released when the officer didn't find enough evidence to prove that he knew about the shipment or that it belonged to him.

685 The confiscation of the cigarettes enraged both Hadi and his part-
627 ners. They went to Sheikh Ta'ib, the Aqila of bait Eweidha to which Hadi
578 belonged. They told him about their conversation with Rabbu in Alexandria and said that they thought he was the one who informed the police about the shipment. Ta'ib said that Rabbu must have done this because of old

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221 them to live on the country to a great extent. In normal times
233 the Bedouin drive their animals on the hoof to Egyptian
[439] markets, slowly, along this rich southern pasture belt, grazing as they go, so that they arrive in good condition. Finally, there can be no doubt about the correctness of the Arab claim that a few weeks residence in the open steppe is a tonic for man and beast.

233 It must be remembered that there are no water problems at
312 this time of year. Sheep, goats, and camels do not have to be
423 watered from the time the first rains make grass till the end of April or early in May: even horses do not drink until well into April. This fact is important, because it means that the prolific pastures can be grazed by all without dispute, since the wells, which belong to tribal sections or families, are not drawn on. While rain is still falling regularly human requirements are met from pools. To the south of the Tariq 'Aziza, generally speaking, there is no ownership in land—there are no *hudud*, boundaries, as the Arabs say—and anyone may cultivate or graze where he pleases, but there is strict ownership in wells; whereas to the north of the Tariq 'Aziza there is less narrowly restricted ownership in water, which is here spring water in abundance, but there are well-defined rights in arable.[1] The water of the southern wells is essential for the Bedouin who own the country and who live in it all the year round, and their rights are respected by those who graze
233 there. Sheep and goats need only drink every second or third
312 day, even in the hottest weather, so that in the period of meagre pasturage they have a wide range of grazing from the wells, and the dry grasses, supplemented by evergreen shrubs of the goosefoot family, are sufficient nourishment for them. Wells are numerous in the steppe but few of them last out the summer.

233 The animals grazed in the southern steppe are mostly sheep
and camels. The Bedouin say 'Cattle and goats do not migrate;
[221] camels and sheep do'. Camels are essential to nomadic life as it is impossible to move camp without them, and the richer Bedouin are in camels the more frequently they move, seeking
231 richer pastures. Cyrenaican dromedaries are heavy beasts,

[1] Enzo Savarese, *Le Terre della Cirenaica*, Pt. II, 1928, Chap. VII; Massimo Colucci, *Il Regime della Proprietà Fondiaria nell' Africa Italiana*, vol. i, 1942, pp. 210 seq. and 220 seq.

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useful mostly for transport and ploughing, though they give a good milk yield and a fair harvest of wool. There are horses, of Berber rather than of Arab type, in every big camp. They are kept for the saddle alone, being much used in old days for hawking, and are a sign of wealth and social position.

The census figures for domesticated animals are probably highly inaccurate. The flocks and herds were certainly much greater, especially for camels and horses, before the Italians ravaged the country. The Turkish figures for 1910 were 713,000 sheep, 546,300 goats, 83,300 camels, 23,600 cattle, and 27,000 horses, and it has been reckoned that by 1933 these had been reduced to 98,000 sheep, 25,000 goats, 2,600 camels, 8,700 cattle, and 1,000 horses.[1] Before the outbreak of the second Italo-Sanusi war in 1923 the normal export to the markets of Egypt was 80,000 sheep and goats a year, and it was reckoned that a settled Cyrenaica could produce annually for export at least 100,000 to 150,000 sheep and goats and 6,000 camels. The country used to satisfy a considerable portion of Egypt's meat requirements. It also exported clarified butter in big quantities, 91,835 kilograms being the figure for 1922 and 75,462 the figure for 1923.[2]

Although the Bedouin are by practice and inclination shepherds first and cultivators afterwards, all plough. Barley and some wheat are a staple food. Indeed, in most years they cultivate a surplus of barley which they trade, and it may be said that for the most part they are self-supporting as far as their flour requirements go. On the southern slopes of the plateau and in the *barqa* plain ploughing begins from the middle of October to the middle of November, according to the rains. The coastal belt is sown a little later and the plateau in December and January when the grasses begin to sprout. By mid-April the first harvest, that of the *barqa* and the southern slopes of the plateau, is being reaped, and on the plateau reaping goes on from May to the end of August. Everywhere barley is sown greatly in excess of wheat, for wheaten bread is not considered a necessity and barley is required for horses as well as for men.

[1] Jean Despois, *La Colonisation Italienne en Libya: Problèmes et Méthodes*, 1935, p. 44; Hans w: son Ahlmann, *La Libia Settentrionale*, 1930, p. 78. (First published in 1928.)

[2] *L'Oltremare*, Mar. 1930; *Rivista delle Colonie Italiane*, 1934, p. 885; Francesco Coro, *Settantasei Anni di Dominazione Turca in Libia*, 1937, p. 82.

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243 They could not sow a better crop. There are wild varieties of barley in Cyrenaica and the country is in every way suited to its culture. It is very hardy, stands up to drought, and easily holds its own against the grasses, which are ploughed in with the seed on the plateau. When the barley and wheat have [251] been reaped, the grain is stored in *kuf*. On the plateau these are ancient tomb-caves; elsewhere they are holes dug in the ground.

[731] In a bad year, and even more in a succession of bad years, the Bedouin have experienced famine, but in most years the barley, and to a lesser extent the wheat, give an abundant [433] yield. Bedouin have told me that they expect from sowing in the beds of wadis up to a hundredfold of barley and in the *barqa* up to fiftyfold. On the plateau the yield is smaller and in the Marmarica and Sirtica much smaller. In Turkish times [439] there was a large export of grain from Cyrenaica. Mondaini says that it was to the mean annual value of 40,000 Lire Sterling for the years 1885 to 1900.[1] Much of this surplus was bought by English brewers.

433 The Bedouin way of life is well adapted to their environment.
182 Given the inconstancy of the rainfall and the distribution of water supplies they would be foolish indeed were they not, at any rate in part, shepherds. They are not, of course, in all
433 respects self-supporting. They make their winter tents and a
439 good part of their equipment, carpets, sacks, and so forth, from
182 the wool of their beasts, but some things the Bedouin regard as
[239] necessities have to be imported, notably tea, sugar, some rice, and cloth, especially the *jird*, the woollen cloak of the country. They trade these with surplus stock on the hoof, skins, wool, clarified butter, surplus barley, and honey and wax, so that they are in an economic sense self-supporting.

433 Cyrenaica is a rich country for Bedouin, a poor country for
182 Europeans. Bedouin generally have no overhead expenses in
[556] production. I say generally, because rich men sometimes
[233] employ shepherds, though this is usually the practice of urban
[464] merchants engaged in the sheep trade. Bedouin use their own labour and that of their families and animals. What is perhaps
[511] more important is that they are prepared to live on what

[1] G. Mondaini, *Manuale di Storia e Legislazione Coloniale del Regno d'Italia*. 1927, p. 308.

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632 communities. They are strangers to each other who meet but
369 do not mix. There is a barrier between them and each distrusts
641 the other. Nevertheless there is a measure of economic inter-dependence between them, and the tribes and the towns affect each other politically. In Turkish times the urban population,
632 which, as we have seen, was small and contained a high pro-
439 portion of Jews, was engaged in trade and domestic industries.
438 The townsmen bought from the Bedouin animals, hides, wool,
369 clarified butter, honey, beeswax, and ostrich feathers (ostriches were still hunted in the southern steppe in those days), and they supplied the Bedouin with those things he required but could not, or would not, make for himself: tea, sugar, rice, cloth, horseshoes, musket balls, flints, gunpowder, and earthenware. The urban craftsmen also made leather goods, manufactured salt from sea water, and conducted trade and exchange. Imports came by sea from Tripoli, Marseilles, London, Malta, Alexandria, and Crete, and overland from Alexandria.

But the townsmen of Cyrenaica never dominated the country as they dominate most of the Arab lands, where through usury, intimidation, monopoly of trade, and influence in the administration and the courts they have reduced the countryman to the position of landless labourer or *métayage* serf. There was nothing in the Bedouin way of life which gave an opening to the usurer. Moreover, the towns had no monopoly of trade for, if necessary, the Bedouin could, since they were self-supporting in necessities, either go without urban supplies or obtain them overland from Egypt, as they showed during their war with the
[565] Italians. Consequently there were no rich landowning families living in the towns at the expense of the country-side, no aghas, beys, and pashas; and an educated middle class hardly existed outside the small official circle and lacked both wealth and influence. In general it may be said that in Cyrenaica the towns were not parasites on the country, but had their proper functions as trading centres and suppliers of the needs of the Bedouin population. The markets were free, not tied to town societies.
632 Nor could the Bedouin be coerced by force or law. The tribes
*648 were largely inaccessible and they were stronger than the towns,
369 even with the administration behind them. The Bedouin were not afraid of the Turkish Administration, which sat very lightly on their shoulders, and they did not use the courts. The

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same time as the Jawazi, by a combination of the 'Awaqir, the Magharba, and the Bara'asa, assisted by the Caramanli rulers of Tripoli, and are now settled in the provinces of Fayum, Bani Suef, Bahaira, and Minya in Egypt. The Jawazi used to live in the country now occupied by the 'Awaqir, and they now mostly live in Minya Province of Egypt and in the Fayum. Another struggle which greatly altered the tribal distribution in Cyrenaica was two wars, the last about 1832, of the Magharba and 'Awaqir, aided by their Jibarna kinsmen the 'Abid and 'Arafa, against the tribes which occupied the *barqa* and the remnants of which now range the littoral of the western Sirtica. These tribes are known as *al-'Arab al-Gharb*, the Western Arabs.

So, in 1800 the Harabi and Jibarna tribes, which are now in undisputed control of all Cyrenaica outside the towns, occupied only part of the country, mostly the central, and the most northerly reaches of the western, plateau. The Jibarna were cut off from the southern steppe by the Fawayid and Jawazi, the whole of the *barqa* was occupied by *al-'Arab al-Gharb*, and the eastern part of the plateau by the Aulad 'Ali. The wars by which they drove out their rivals were long and savagely fought and many incidents in them still form part of Bedouin tradition.

As a result of these tribal wars the descendants of the Bani Sulaim invaders of Cyrenaica and the Maghrib thus began to return eastwards with a quota of Berber blood about the end of the seventeenth century and pushed out the tribes they found dwelling in the Western Desert of Egypt and pressed them into the Delta, where they were absorbed by the *fallahin*. The first intruders from the west were pushed to the Nile by stronger tribes coming behind them and these by yet stronger. They pushed one another like trucks on a siding. The Hanadi pushed out the Bani 'Una and the Aulad 'Ali pushed out the Hanadi, being themselves pushed on from behind by the 'Abaidat and other Harabi tribes. Besides the migration of whole tribes from Cyrenaica into Egypt there has taken place an exodus of many tribal sections and fragments, owing to intertribal fighting, until to-day there is not a Cyrenaican tribe, or even large section, which has not some of its members in Egypt, often whole lineages. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica know their kinsmen in Egypt and sometimes when the price of sheep is low in the Egyptian markets they leave their animals with them to sell on their behalf when prices rise.

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sadaqa, freewill gifts, though if a lodge did not send them its Shaikh was reminded of his obligations. The lodges dealt with certain trading houses at Banghazi, giving them import orders against future sales of local produce.

This practice worked well enough during the lifetime of the founder and his sons but, as so often happens in Islamic Orders, later descendants began to demand individual shares in the wealth of the Order. While Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif was its third Head it began to be the custom, a few years before the Italian invasion, to earmark the surplus revenues of particular lodges for particular members of the Sanusi family, and these members became regarded as patrons of the lodges which supplied them and responsible for their supervision. The territories in which the Order was dominant began to fall into spheres of influence controlled by individual members of the family, the allocation of spheres tending to be determined by the maternal kinship of various members with *Ikhwan* families occupying lodges in them. Sayyid Muhammad 'Abid and his brother Sayyid 'Ali al-Khattab had a lien on the *barqa al-baida* and Fazzan, where their maternal relatives the Ashhab family were influential Shaikhs of lodges; Sayyid Safi al-Din on the *barqa al-hamra*, where his maternal kinsmen the Mahajib family were predominant; Sayyid Muhammad Hilal on the Marmarica where his maternal kinsmen of the Sharifian Tursh lineage had considerable influence; and Sayyid Idris and his brother Sayyid al-Rida on the Cyrenaican plateau, where they had maternal ties with the important Bu Saif and Ghumari families. Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif had a lien on Tripolitania, where lived his maternal kinsmen the powerful Fawatir tribe of Zlitin territory.

The endowments of the Order in Cyrenaica ran into thousands of hectares.[1] Several lodges had each more than 1,000 hectares attached to them. The fourteen lodges whose lands were technically registered in 1919 by a mixed Italo-Sanusi commission possessed more than 50,000 hectares. The total lands of the Order may well have been more than 200,000 hectares, or somewhere in the neighbourhood of 500,000 acres. Much of the land was of use only for grazing, but much was valuable agricultural country on the plateau. Wherever there were

[1] An *Ettaro* is 10,000 sq. metres or 2·471 acres.

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*175 *648 zone of al-Marj there was also heavy fighting. Here the Italians were on the defensive and the Arabs attacking in a way very costly to themselves. There was also fighting in the Darna zone.

The total result of these operations in all parts of the country was that by mid-July all the principal Turco-Arab camps in central and western Cyrenaica had been occupied: al-'Arqub, Marawa, Taknis, al-Shlaidima, and Ajadabiya. The Bedouin forces had been compelled to withdraw to south of the Wadi al-Farigh, to the southern slopes of the plateau, and to the Marmarica. They continued, nevertheless, especially from the southern slopes of the plateau, to conduct improvised attacks on caravans and advanced posts. It was therefore decided to expel them from their new refuges on these slopes, and with this end in view Italian columns penetrated into the desert-scrub country to the south of the plateau in pursuit of the enemy. The Bedouin bands withdrew eastwards under the pressure of these attacks and formed concentrations at Khawalan and in the Marmarica. They were being hard pressed and had to face at the same time enemies more lethal and demoralizing than Italian arms: plague, smallpox, typhus, and drought and locusts [931] bringing famine in their train. The crops had failed for two years in succession in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania; and local markets were in the hands of the Italians. The only source of [439] supplies open to the Bedouin were the Egyptian ports, chiefly al-Sallum, and the markets of the Delta, and from these points large, but insufficient, quantities of food, particularly flour, poured in a steady stream across the frontier.

Bedouin mortality was certainly high. Lo Bello reckoned that by the end of 1914 nearly two-thirds of the population of Cyrenaica had died, 300,000 in 1911 being reduced to 120,000 in 1915.[1] One must agree, however, with Mondaini,[2] that Lo Bello's figure is exaggerated, for the casualties were almost entirely among the Bedouin and had they been as high as he puts them the long resistance of the Bedouin against the Italians in the second Italo-Sanusi war would have been impossible. In spite of their heavy losses and the great hardships they had to endure they kept up the struggle in a succession of

[1] 'Le Vicende politico-militari dei primi dodici Anni di Occupazione Italiana in Cirenaica', *Rivista Coloniale*, 1925, p. 126.

[2] Op. cit., p. 374.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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to adapt themselves to the kind of fighting which seldom fails to upset the orthodox military mind. Text-book strategy does not apply to an enemy who wanders at will over a country with which he is familiar from birth, among a friendly people ready to provide him with exact intelligence, and in small mobile bands; and whose strategy is little more than the guerrilla imperatives—strike suddenly, strike incessantly, strike hard, get out quick. An army can only be manœuvred to inflict defeats on the enemy and to destroy his armed forces when he has an opposing army which can be brought to decisive engagements. The Italians were fighting a people, not an army, and a people can only be defeated by total imprisonment or extermination.

If the Bedouin had had anything which could clearly have been isolated as 'armed forces', these could easily have been destroyed by Italian superiority in men and machines. But they had nothing which could, properly speaking, be called an army, and they had no lines which could be pierced or turned and no strongholds which could be taken or in which troops could be contained. Against Bedouin it was of little profit to occupy towns and villages, for they retired to less accessible regions or circulated gaily between the Italian garrisons. Control of the roads and ports was also of little benefit. Roads were meaningless to the Bedouin and they were independent of overseas trade since they could live on the country for immediate necessities and obtain from Egypt what few additional supplies they required to carry on the war. To ease the supply problem, as well as to be of maximum nuisance to the Italian garrisons and convoys, the guerrilla bands were kept as small and mobile as possible. Their smallness and mobility confused the slow and unwieldy Italian columns. If the columns split up they were liable to be surrounded by concerted action of the bands and annihilated, whereas if they kept together, the cost of formation was the loss of speed and surprise. There seemed to be no enemy forces to fight, yet attack was incessant. There were no fixed points of opposition. It was indefinite and disseminated.

Even when contact could be established with the guerrilla bands and they could be defeated, as they often were, their defeat could not be turned into more than a temporary rout, for there was no highly organized tactical system to be upset,

Second, the fiction that nothing has happened, which characterises the father's behavior, does not cease with the termination of the celebrations. Each morning, soon after daybreak and before the camp is astir, the groom must leave his bride and repair to his father's tent to lie at his father's side "as he always had done in the past, as if he had not left him." This conventional ruse is followed, not just for the seven days of wedding festivities, but is continued after the groom has moved back into the camp proper, and pitched his tent alongside his father's, with the ropes of the two tents crossing.

In matters other than sleeping arrangements, this fiction that "nothing has happened" is maintained. Marriage does not mean the immediate creation of a wholly separate domestic unit. Save for the appearance of an additional tent, the ordinary run of daytime activities is scarcely altered. To mention perhaps the most important feature of the relationships between father and son, the groom continues to eat with his father. As yet, the son does not use his own bowl,[1] and may not, indeed, do so for several years. The important symbolism of "eating together" or "eating out of the one bowl," the act of commensality creating a bond of fellowship about which Robertson Smith[2] wrote so eloquently can only be referred to here in one of its many aspects. Bedouin themselves stress that eating together is a strong bond, and the communal meal is always used for this purpose after the settlement of a dispute, or at the conclusion of a blood-money agreement, and so on. It is significant also in the sense that those who partake of a meal accept the authority of the host; he becomes their protector, and a blow against one of them is struck at him also. Even if the guest is an enemy,[3] as long as he has eaten from another's bowl his life is safe.

The slaughter of an animal for another person creates a bond which has its roots in the intimate connection between man and his animals. In a very vivid way, the Bedouin view their animals as part of themselves, as part of their *Risiq*, their general wealth, in which their sons are included. It is this mystical association between a man and his animals which distinguishes a meal consisting of the meat of an animal slaughtered from ones' own flock or herd from a meal consisting of meat bought from a butcher's shop — often given by the plateau peoples of Northern Cyrenaica to their guests, but which the camel-herding Bedouin of the south regard as despicable hospitality. A slaughtered animal is the food, *par excellence*, which establishes this bond

[1] When Bedouin take their meals, they eat from large wooden bowls imported from south of the Sahara. It is a matter of custom that a man does not eat alone unless it is unavoidable, a custom of such strength, that, when, one day, only an elder, occupying a tent the ropes of which were crossed with mine, was left in camp, he brought his bowl into my tent "so that I will be eating with a man."

[2] William Robertson Smith. *The Religion of the Semites*. 3rd ed. London: Macmillan, 1927.

[3] A stranger entering a camp is under no obligation to give his identity. Few do so until they have partaken of a meal. In the past, the Bedouin claim, the period of anonymity could last for 40 days, but nowadays, they say they limit it to two only. I have known strangers enter a camp, receive entertainment, and leave without offering any specific identity.